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The home rule provisions in Illinois’ 1970 constitution represent a
unique innovation in the way states bestow power and authority on
their city and county governments. Through its home rule system,
Illinois gives the broadest and most liberal authority to cities and
counties of any state in the nation. With Illinois now completing
thirty years of home rule experience, the time is appropriate to
undertake a comprehensive assessment of Illinois’ experience with
home rule. Such is the task of the following paragraphs.

Who uses home rule?

The mission of the Center
for Governmental Studies
includes education of the
public on important public
policy issues. This article is
one in a series of policy
briefs designed to provide an
objective view of an issue.

At the time of the November 2000
elections, Illinois had 147 cities and
villages and one county (Cook) with
home rule powers. Of the home rule
cities, 77 had gained home rule by
virtue of their size (all cities over
25,000 are granted home rule automatically unless it is rescinded in a
city referendum) and 70 had gained
home rule by referendum (the constitution gives cities under 25,000 this
option). A list of current home rule
users is provided in Table 1 on the
next page.
Ironically, although a minority of
municipalities and counties have home
rule, over seven million Illinois
residents live in a home rule community — and most have done so for
more than a quarter of a century. Thus
it is safe to conclude that Illinois
voters have had widespread experience with home rule.

How do voters feel about home
rule?
Because having a referendum on home
rule is relatively easy, there have been
191 such referenda — an average of
more than 6 per year — in Illinois
home rule’s thirty year history. As
might be expected, the aggregate of
those referenda present a mixed voter
reaction to home rule. Voters supported home rule in 97 of those
referenda and rejected it in 94 others.
As Table 2 (on page 3) shows, however, there are three different kinds of
home rule referenda and each reflects
a different picture of voter attitudes
toward home rule.
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Home Rule Units in Illinois as of November 2000

Cities and villages adopting home rule by referendum have the date of the referendum indicated.
Those with no date gained home rule automatically because of population size.
I. Counties
Cook

II. Cities and Villages
Addison
Alton
Alsip, 1990
Arlington Heights
Aurora
Barrington Hills, 1990
Bartlett
Bedford Park, 1971
Belleville
Bellwood, 1994
Berkeley, 1994
Berwyn
Bloomingdale, 1996
Bloomington
Bolingbrook
Bryant, 1974
Buffalo Grove, 1980
Burbank
Burnham, 1980
Cahokia, 1997
Calumet City
Calumet Park, 1976
Carbondale
Carol Stream
Carpentersville, 1993
Champaign
Channahon, 1982
Chicago
Chicago Heights
Chicago Ridge, 1994
Cicero
Country Club Hills, 1993
Countryside, 1972
Crystal Lake
Danville
Darien
Decatur
Deerfield, 1975
DeKalb

Des Plaines
Dolton
Downers Grove
East Hazel Crest, 1989
East St. Louis
Elgin
Elk Grove Village
Elmhurst
Elmwood Park
Elwood, 1997
Evanston
Evergreen Park, 1982
Fairview Heights, 1993
Flora, 1975
Freeport
Galesburg
Glendale Heights
Glen Ellyn
Glenview
Glenwood, 1986
Golf, 1976
Granite City
Gurnee
Hanover Park
Harvey
Harwood Heights, 1995
Highland Park
Hillside, 1995
Hodgkins, 1996
Hoffman Estates
Inverness, 2000
Joliet
Kankakee
Lake Barrington, 1991
Lansing
Lincolnshire, 1975
Lincolnwood, 1997
Manhattan, 1996
Marion, 1994

Mascoutah, 1979
Maywood
McCook, 1971
Mettawa, 1990
Moline
Monee, 1996
Monmouth, 1999
Morton Grove
Mound City, 1973
Mount Prospect
Mt. Vernon, 1986
Muddy, 1981
Mundelein
Murphysboro, 1994
Naperville
Naples, 1982
Niles
Normal
Norridge, 1973
Northbrook
North Chicago
Northlake, 1994
Oak Forest
Oak Lawn
Oak Park
Old Mill Creek, 1993
Orland Park
Palatine
Park City, 1973
Park Forest
Park Ridge
Pekin
Peoria
Peoria Heights, 1986
Peru, 1981
Quincy
Rantoul, 1982
Robbins, 1998
Rockdale, 1982

Rock Island
Rolling Meadows, 1985
Rosemont, 1972
St. Charles
Sauget, 1976
Schaumburg
Schiller Park, 1994
Sesser, 1989
Skokie
South Barrington, 1975
South Holland
Springfield
Standard, 1975
Stickney, 1974
Stone Park, 1972
Streamwood
Sycamore, 1996
Thornton, 1980
Tinley Park
University Park, 1975
Urbana
Valmeyer, 1994
Washington, 1998
Watseka
Waukegan
West Dundee, 1990
Wheaton
Wheeling, 1977
Wilmette
Woodridge, 1975
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Home Rule Referenda Record

Years

Total
Number
of
Referenda

1971-75

Total Referenda
For + or Against Home Rule

Municipal
Adoption
Referenda

Municipal
Retention
Referenda

County
Adoption
Referenda

+

-

%+

+

-

+

-

+

-

36

20

16

56

19

7

1

0

0

9

1976-80

42

21

21

50

8

17

13

2

0

2

1981-85

23

16

7

70

9

5

7

2

1986-90

27

11

16

41

9

16

2

0

1991-95

36

17

19

46

15

19

2

0

1996-2000

27

12

15

44

12

15

191

97

94

51

72

79

25

4

0

11

Totals

Note: Table summarizes all home rule referenda held prior to November 2000.
November 2000 data not available when this report was prepared.

Do county voters support home
rule?
No. Nine counties held a total of
eleven referenda between 1972-76 to
adopt home rule. All failed by substantial margins. In the aggregate, county
voters rejected home rule by a margin
of 3-1. No county has attempted such
a referendum since 1976.
But the picture is more complex. The
framers of Illinois’ 1970 constitution
wanted to strengthen county govern-

ment by encouraging the use of elected
county executive officers — an office
previously used only in Cook County.
The framers used home rule as an
inducement to the voters to adopt such
a change. Instead, by combining two
separate issues in one referendum, the
framers effectively blocked the
adoption of either an elected county
executive or home rule.
But the legislature later gave voters
another option: a county executive
plan without home rule. Voters in
several counties (e.g. Kane, Will,

Madison) adopted this plan. Many
other counties have passed ordinances
creating the office of county administrator to strengthen the executive
function in county government.
The fact that these structural changes
have taken place but county home rule
has still not been adopted by referendum further emphasizes county voters’
rejection of home rule for counties
other than Cook. Voters in Cook
County have never attempted to
rescind county home rule.
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Are city and village voters more
supportive of home rule?
Yes. In home rule adoption referenda,
home rule support and opposition have
been much more evenly divided. There
have been 151 municipal adoption
referenda: voters in 74 referenda voted
to adopt home rule; voters in the
remaining 79 referenda voted not to
adopt home rule.
But some communities have had more
than one referendum. Alsip,
Bloomingdale, Lincolnshire, Sesser,
and Stickney voters first voted to
reject home rule and later voted to
adopt it. Lincolnwood voters twice
voted to reject home rule and then
adopted it in the third referendum.
Long Grove voters have rejected home
rule in three different referenda. Lisle
voters first adopted home rule and two
years later voted it out. Correcting for
these multiple referenda, the final
figures emerge: 141 communities have
had one or more referenda on whether
to use home rule. Of these, 72 adopted
home rule and 70 continue to use it.
(Besides Lisle, National City also once
had home rule, but the community
ceased to exist when the last of its 45
residents moved away).

tablethree Home Rule Retention Referenda
Year

Community

Outcome

Year

Community

Outcome

1972

Danville

Retain

1981

Dolton

Retain

1976

Aurora

Retain

Calumet City

Retain

Park Ridge

Retain

Lombard

Abolish

Elgin

Retain

Maywood

Retain

Lisle

Abolish

South Holland

Retain

Rockford

Retain

Rock Island

Retain

Decatur

Retain

Glenview

1977
1978
1979
1980

1982

Evergreen Park Retain
Rantoul

Retain

1983

Rockford

Abolish

Retain

1985

Berwyn

Retain

Elmwood Park

Retain

1987

Pekin

Retain

Highland Park

Retain

1990

Decatur

Retain

Lincolnshire

Retain

1992

Berwyn

Retain

Morton Grove

Retain

Park Forest

Retain

Peoria

Retain

Villa Park

Abolish

Wilmette

Retain
Referenda Retaining Home Rule:

25

Referenda Abolishing Home Rule:

4

Total Retention Referenda:

Do voters in communities with
home rule support the home rule
system?
Home rule’s greatest voter support, by
far, has come in referenda held to
decide whether or not a community’s
existing home rule system should be
retained. There have been a total of 29

29

such referenda; voters have opted to
retain home rule in 25 or 86 per cent
(see Table 3 above). In the aggregate,
voters living in home rule communities have opted, by a margin of 3-2, to
retain their community’s home rule
powers.
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Of the four communities which had
and then abandoned home rule, the
voters in two — Lisle and Rockford
— reacted negatively to actual or
proposed home rule use. In two others
— Lombard and Villa Park — voters
rejected home rule in the mistaken
assumption that it would lower their
taxes (mistaken because their home
rule powers had not been used to levy
any taxes).
The experience of these four communities demonstrated that voters can,
when motivated to do so, abolish an
operating home rule system.

So, how do voters feel about home
rule?
In the 152 Illinois local governments
that have tried home rule in the last
thirty years, 147, or 97 per cent, still
have it. Voters in only 26 of these
communities, or 17 per cent, have
even challenged the system with a
retention election. In short, where
home rule has been tried in Illinois,
voters have been supportive of it.

What issues have concerned
voters?
Supporters of home rule have pointed
to the value of local authority and
flexibility to address local problems,
lessened dependence upon the state
legislature, and more freedom from

legislative mandates. They stress the
greater flexibility home rule gives
local governments to deal with issues
of community development, to prevent
community blight, and to shift local
tax burdens to non-residents, primarily
through sales and use taxes.
Opponents of home rule focus upon
the threat of unwanted and excessive
taxation under home rule governments. Sometimes, too, opponents
argue that home rule gives local
governments the power to suppress
individual rights.

What does the record show on
these issues?
There is a diverse body of evidence
that indicates that home rule communities have used their more flexible
powers in innovative ways to address
local problems. The most commonly
cited uses of home rule powers have
involved economic development,
control of community development,
reduced borrowing costs, and local tax
burdens shifted to non-residents.
Opponents argue that home rule brings
much heavier tax burdens for local
residents. Their claims rely on anecdotal, not empirical evidence. Surprisingly, they do not cite their most
compelling case — the City of Rockford — where voters abolished home
rule after the city council enacted a
series of property tax increases.
In contending that home rule powers
are used to suppress individual rights,
opponents of home rule cite the

5

Morton Grove home rule ordinance
prohibiting hand gun ownership.
However, the Illinois Supreme Court
ruled in 1984 that the ordinance did
not violate any constitutional rights
under either the Illinois or U.S.
constitutions. (Kalodimos v Morton
Grove, 1984).
Anticipating the potential for abusive
use of home rule powers, the framers
of the 1970 Illinois constitution
established constitutional safeguards
to prevent such abuses. There are three
kinds of such safeguards: electoral
recision discussed above, legislative
preemption, and judicial review. The
latter two are discussed in the following paragraphs.

What is legislative preemption and
how has it worked?
Recognizing that there would be
overlaps between state and local
governments in the exercise of power,
the Illinois constitution gave the
Illinois General Assembly the authority to preempt or take away home rule
powers by a 3/5ths vote of both houses
or to provide for the exclusive state
exercise of a power by a simple
majority vote of both houses. These
provisions give the legislature broad
leeway to reduce home rule powers.
But, while the Assembly has used its
preemption powers to deal with
specific issues, it has not seriously
eroded the home rule authority set
forth in the constitution.
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In some respects, the legislature has
been supportive of home rule power.
It has, for example, stipulated by law
that no legislative enactment shall be
construed as restricting home rule
power unless that enactment has
“specific language limiting or denying” the home rule power.
Except for a series of bills restricting
home rule authority to license or
regulate specific occupations, the
General Assembly did little in home
rule’s first 15 years to limit home rule
powers, but such limitations have
become more common in the last 15
years.
Legislative limitations can be grouped
into several categories. In one category
are laws like the Open Meetings Act
and statutes containing state-wide
rules governing public labor relations.
These apply state-wide principles of
good government to home rule units.
A second category has clarified the
state’s exclusive role in regulating
certain businesses and activities. For
instance, to reduce drunk driving
accidents, the legislature took away
home rule powers to set minimum
ages for the purchase of alcoholic
beverages, but it also eliminated
particular drinking age problems
which had faced communities with
college campuses.

Third, the legislature has established
exclusive state authority over certain
personnel policies in local government. Again, the legislature has
protected the obvious benefits that
stem from uniform state-wide practices, such as state-wide municipal
employee retirement programs, in this
field.

Has the legislature preempted any
home rule tax powers?
The final category is legislative action
taken to limit home rule tax powers.
The legislature imposed a referendum
requirement on the use of a real estate
transfer tax, effectively limiting further
use of the tax. It also eliminated home
rule authority to impose local sales
taxes. In the latter instance, however,
it authorized home rule units to raise
the rate of the local portion of the state
sales tax levy. Thus, while limiting
home rule power and flexibility, the
legislature protected home rule access
to additional revenues from the use of
the sales tax (called the retail occupation tax in Illinois law).
Perhaps most important is what the
legislature has not done. It has not
authorized local use of an income tax;
it has not imposed a limit on real
estate taxes levied with home rule
powers; and it has not imposed limits
on borrowing and indebtedness by
home rule units. Furthermore, the
legislature has exempted home rule
units from complying with tax caps
recently imposed on the annual rate of
increase in local property taxes.

In the last ten years, the legislature
also initiated the practice of “partial
exemptions” — imposing obligations
or denying powers to some but not all
home rule units. To date, partial
exemption laws have treated Chicago
differently than other home rule units.
This practice weakens home rule by
splitting the block of legislators who
represent the interests of home rule
governments in the legislature. The
result has been preemptions of home
rule powers that local governments
have been unable to prevent.

How has judicial review affected
home rule powers?
Specific uses of home rule powers
have often been challenged in the
courts which, in turn, have frequently
but not always upheld a liberal
interpretation of home rule powers.
For example, besides the Morton
Grove handgun ordinance, the courts
have upheld: the sale of general
obligation bonds without a referendum
(Kanellos v County of Cook, 1972); a
home rule ordinance that authorizes
actions contrary to state statutes
(Rozner v Korshak, 1973), and a home
rule ordinance that legislates concurrently with the state on environmental
matters (Chicago v Pollution Control
Board, 1974).
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But the courts have also been willing
to constrain home rule uses it views as
excessive. It refused, for example, to
enforce a Des Plaines noise pollution
ordinance against a railroad, holding
that noise pollution was a matter
requiring regional or state-wide rather
than local regulation (Des Plaines v
Chicago & Northwestern Ry., 1976).
It struck down ordinances altering the
statutory appointment powers of
municipal officials, (Pechous v
Slawko, 1976), and an ordinance
imposing a local fee on filing cases in
civil court (Ampersand v Finley,
1975).
The courts have treated the use of
home rule taxing powers in a similar
manner. They have: upheld home rule
wheel taxes (Gilligan v Korzen, 1974),
upheld Chicago’s employers’ expense
tax (Paper Supply v Chicago, 1974),
and approved a home rule admissions
tax (Cicero v Fox Valley Trotting
Club, 1976; Kerasotes Rialto Theatre
v Peoria, 1979), but they struck down
home rule utility tax levies which
exceeded statutory rate limits
(Waukegan Community Unit School
District v Waukegan, 1983).
The courts thus have demonstrated
that they will constrain home rule
actions they deem to be beyond the
scope of constitutional and statutory
restrictions.

As the body of case law regarding
home rule has grown, the courts have
tended to reaffirm the precedents set in
the early years. For instance, the courts
reaffirmed, in 1998, that, despite
ordinances to the contrary, home rule
municipalities have a duty to bargain
collectively with employee unions
(Public Labor Council v Cicero,
1998); and they reaffirmed the principle that implied preemption is not
sufficient to deny home rule communities the power to regulate matters of
local affairs (Bolingbrook v Citizens
Utility Co, 1994; Barrington Police
Pension Fund v Barrington Ethics
Board, 1997). The Supreme Court has
also upheld partial preemption (Nevitt
v Langfelder, 1993).

So what does all of this mean for
Illinois’ home rule system?
All of this means that the home rule
system adopted in Illinois as part of
the state’s 1970 constitution has
demonstrated after thirty years, that it
is a workable system for empowering
local governments. Illinois home rule
has served, and continues to serve over
seven million people in 148 local
governments. It gives residents in nonhome rule counties, cities, and villages
additional options when searching for
new ways to solve community problems.
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